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Note
Zoning Growth Controls
For the General Welfare
Construction Industry Association v.
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the nation, suburbs located near established met-
ropolitan centers are seeking ways to provide necessary municipal
services to rapidly expanding populations without substantial in-
creases in local taxes. In doing so, they wish to preserve the
character of their community and avoid any undesirable growth.'
This new attitude toward urban growth was displayed in the com-
prehensive plan developed for Petaluma, California. In Construc-
tion Industry Association v. Petaluma,2 the Ninth Circuit found
that the Petaluma Plan ("the Plan") was a reasonable attempt by
the city to deal with these growth pressures when it found itself
unable to provide needed public services, such as sewage disposal
plants, schools, water supplies, parks, fire protection and health
services.3
Communities, such as Petaluma, are expected to provide for
the interests of present and future citizens and still take into
account the impact which their actions will have on the larger
metropolitan area. They must often act without effective regional
or statewide standards to guide them in making the necessary
decisions. However, they also need flexible controls to enable
them to balance increased housing needs with diminished land
resources and growing needs for public services with tight munici-
pal budgets.4
This note examines the judicial approach taken in Petaluma
and contrasts it with state court decisions which have generally
1. D. FALK & H. FRANELiN, LocAL GROwTH AND MANAGEMENT POLICY:
A LEGAL PamvmE 1 (Potomac Institute 1975).
2. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
3. Gray, The City of Petaluma: Residential Development Control, in 2
MANAGEMNT & CONTROL OF GRoWTa 149, 153 (Urban Land Institute
1975).
4. Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land
Development, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1974).
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considered judicial intervention to be an appropriate device to
strike down local zoning regulations when they have not properly
provided for regional problems.
II. THE FACTS
The City of Petaluma is located about 40 miles north of San
Francisco, in southern Sonoma County. Highway 101, the main
north-south route through the Petaluma Valley, was relocated and
widened into a freeway in 1956, bringing with it a gradually acceler-
ating population growth. The new freeway drew the city into the
Bay Area metropolitan housing market as people working in San
Francisco and San Rafael became willing to commute longer dis-
tances in return for the relatively inexpensive housing available in
Petaluma. From a population of 10,000 people in 1950, the city
grew to 14,000 by 1960 and 24,000 by 1970. Rapid growth
continued, as the city added 5,000 people in less than two years in
1970 and 1971. Most of them moved into housing developments
on land east of the new freeway, across from the city.5
In 1971, alarmed by the accelerated rate of growth, the de-
mand for more housing, and the sprawl of the city eastward,
Petaluma adopted a temporary freeze on development and a zoning
change moratorium which were intended to give the city council
and planners an opportunity to study the housing and zoning
situation and to develop short- and long-range plans.
The Petaluma growth control policy attempted to limit the
number of dwelling units constructed in the city to 500 per year
6
despite the fact that since the 1970-71 period, the market demand
in the Petaluma area had been substantially in excess of this
number.7 Among the other purposes to be achieved by the policy
were to:
(1) preserve the city's small-town character and surrounding open
space by controlling the city's future rate and distribution of
growth; (2) tie the rate of development to school and utility
capacity; (3) encourage a balance of development between eastern
5. FALK, supra note 1, at 16.
6. The Plan did not impose a flat limit of 500 development-units per year,
but did exempt all projects of four units or less. There was no evi-
dence presented as to the number of exempt units expected to be built,
so it was unclear what impact the 500 development-unit limitation
would have on the natural growth of housing in the area. The court's
decision assumed that the 500 development-unit growth rate was in
fact below the reasonably anticipated market demand for such units,
and that faster growth would result in the absence of the Plan. 522
F.2d at 902.
7. Id.
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and western sections of Petaluma, and (4) provide a permanent
greenbelt for definition of urban form and utilize city powers of
utility extension and annexation to support the greenbelt policy.8
The Plan also attempted to alleviate existing problems, such as
rehabilitation of older homes and a deficiency in multifamily units.
A citizen's board was established to administer the 500-unit
quota. It was to allocate eight to twelve per cent each year to low
to moderate income housing and was to distribute these allocations
within the allowable limit to various districts of the city.9
III. THE COURT DECISIONS
Two landowners and the Construction Industry Association of
Sonoma County filed suit against the city, its officers and council
members, claiming that the Plan was unconstitutional. The dis-
trict court'0 ruled that certain aspects of the Plan unconstitutionally
denied the "right to travel" guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution." Because the Plan sought to restrict growth, the court
found that it was
an effort to avoid the problems that accompany contemporary
trends in population growth. Through the plan, the defendants
propose to address themselves to such problems by limiting the
number of people who will henceforth be permitted to move into
the city. The express purpose and the intended and actual effects
of the "Petaluma Plan" have been to exclude substantial numbers
of people who would otherwise have elected to immigrate into the
city.12
The "right to travel" of these excluded individuals, therefore, was
violated.
On its part, the city had argued three compelling interests to
support the exclusionary measures it had adopted. It first pointed
out that while it was necessary for it to provide adequate sewage
treatment facilities, present facilities were inadequate to serve an
uncontrolled population. Second, the city alleged an inadequate
water supply. The court rejected both of these arguments because
there was no connection between the alleged inadequacies and the
exclusionary measures taken.'13 Lastly, the city contended that by
virtue of its zoning power, it had an inherent right to control its
rate of growth and to protect its "small town character." The
8. FALK, supra note 1, at 16.
9. 522 F.2d at 901.
10. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
11. Id. at 581.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 582-83.
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court saw this as the primary issue'4 and rejected it as a violation
of the right to travel.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that a decision on the right
to travel argument was inappropriate because the landowners and
the Association did not have standing to assert the rights of third
parties allegedly excluded by the Plan.' 5 It ruled that the econom-
ic interests of the appellees which were affected were outside the
zone of interest to be protected by the right to travel, and, there-
fore, they did not have the requisite standing to raise the issue.' 6
Rather than cease its inquiry at this point, the court decided to
dispose of the other challenges to the Plan which had not been
decided in the district court. The justification for doing this was to
promote judicial economy. In addition, because the lower court
had made clear its conclusion that the avowed purposes of the Plan
did not amount to legitimate governmental interests, the Ninth
Circuit felt that it would be a wasteful exercise to remand the case
so that the district could consider the other challenges.17
The second argument on appeal questioned the reasonableness
of the zoning ordinance because the express purpose and actual
effect of the Plan, as found by the district court, was to exclude
substantial numbers of people who would otherwise have elected to
move to Petaluma.' Conceding that the Plan had an exclusionary
effect, Judge Choy framed the issue in the following manner: "We
must determine further whether the exclusion bears any rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest."'9 It was concluded that
the regulation was justified by some aspect of the community's
police power which was being asserted for the public welfare.
Relying on Belle Terre v. Boraas,20 the Court found that preserv-
ing the small town character of Petaluma was a legitimate state
interest 2 ' and, therefore, justified the exclusionary effect of the
Plan.
The third argument proffered by the Association alleged that
the Plan posed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
The district court had found that housing in Petaluma and sur-
14. Id. at 583.
15. 522 F.2d at 904.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 905 n.8 and 9.
18. Id. at 906.
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
21. 522 F.2d at 909, where the court found that the Plan was a rational
attempt to preserve Petaluma's open spaces and low population den-
sity and to allow it to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.
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rounding areas was produced substantially through goods and
services in interstate commerce and that curtailment of residential
growth in Petlauma would cause a serious dislocation to com-
merce.22 The Ninth Circuit did not find this argument persuasive
because the regulation neither discriminated against interstate com-
merce nor operated to disrupt its uniformity. 23  It held that the
Plan could be justified by balancing reasonable social welfare
legislation against its incidental burden on commerce.
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The constitutional validity of municipal zoning was established
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 24  Euclid, Ohio, a suburb of
Cleveland, was faced with the prospect of uncontrolled growth as
industry and housing increasingly sought to build within its city
limits. In an effort to provide order to its growth, Euclid passed
zoning regulations for the height, area, and density of new develop-
ment. The regulations were challenged as being violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment but were subsequently upheld as being a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power, asserted for the public welfare.
The Euclid decision was the only major pronouncement of the
Supreme Court for over 35 years. Its impact resulted in judicial
approval of legislative classifications for zoning purposes if the
validity of the classification was fairly debatable.25
After Euclid, municipalities began to develop a variety of
zoning devices to cope with the demands of urban growth. 26 Most
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
25. This is in accord with the command in Euclid: "If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control." 272 U.S. at 388.
26. Through zoning regulations, municipalities have also enacted timing
controls to provide for an orderly development of urban areas. The
concept of tempo and sequence control seems to have been first intro-
duced in Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAw
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 298 (1955). He conceived of tempo controls as af-
fecting the "rate of urban development" and sequence controls as "an
attempt to encourage growth around existing settlements before open-
ing additional lands to intensive use." Id. at 299. He suggested five
motivations for regulating the timing of urban development:
(1) "The need to economize on the costs of municipal facilities and
services." Well-considered plans ,can coordinate the timing for provid-
ing services with the anticipated rate of growth.
(2) "The need to retain municipal control over the eventual charac-
ter of development." If there is no control over the timing of building,
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states have passed enabling statutes which permit a city to develop
a comprehensive plan for structuring its growth in an orderly
fashion and to implement this plan through a comprehensive zon-
ing ordinance. Initally, when a city's comprehensive plan had as
its principal concern the physical development of the land within
and surrounding its boundaries, the variance2 7 was the primary
device providing flexibility in zoning matters and enabling a city to
overcome particular hardships imposed by zoning ordinances. To-
day, zoning devices providing greater flexibility have been de-
signed; 28 in addition, the scope of comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances has been expanded to encompass socio-economic goals,
such as preserving the city's "small town character," the town's
"rural environment, "29 or quiet family neighborhoods.30
As these new zoning techniques were developed to meet the
changing problems brought on by urban growth, the Supreme
Court continued to refuse to hear challenges to them until its
decision in Belle Terre. In that case, Belle Terre, New York had a
zoning ordinance which restricted land use to one-family dwellings
and prohibited occupancy of a dwelling by more than two unrelat-
ed persons as a "family," while permitting occupancy by any
number of persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage. The
plaintiffs were three of six unrelated college students who had been
served with an order to remedy violations of the ordinance. They
contended that the ordinance violated their equal protection rights
early development of an area may later make it impossible to convert
it into the character required by evolving municipal patterns.
(3) "The need to maintain a desirable degree of balance among vari-
ous uses of land." Balanced development between residential, com-
mercial and industrial construction may be important to provide eco-
nomic stability.(4) "The need to achieve greater detail and specificity in develop-
ment regulation." This has been made relevant by the increased re-
quest for and use of special zoning amendments and special use per-
mits.
(5) "The need to maintain a high quality of community services and
facilities." When there is rapid building, there must be time to as-
similate residential, business or industral additions to the community
with adequate provision of services.
Id. at 300-02.
27. A variance is a method to vary or adapt the strict application of a
zoning ordinance in a case where there are exceptional physical condi-
tions and where strict application of the ordinance would deprive the
owner of the reasonable use of the land or building involved.
28. For a discussion of the most extensively utilized zoning techniques,
see D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW 101-62 (1971).
29. Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
30. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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and rights of association, travel, and privacy. The Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance, stating that: it was not aimed at transients
and thus did not violate any right of interstate travel; it involved no
procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on others; it per-
tained to no fundamental constitutional right, such as the right of
association or privacy; and finally, it was reasonable and bore a
rational relationship to a permissible state objective and thus did
not violate the equal protection clause.3 1 Although the full impact
of Belle Terre has not yet become apparent, it clearly indicates that
the Court intends to continue its policy of nonintervention in local
zoning matters.
Despite this position, some state courts, notably those along the
eastern seaboard, have adopted a policy of judicial intervention
when it has been found that a municipality was attempting to avoid
the problems of municipal growth. They have maintained that
judicial intervention is justified if the local ordinance will have a
negative impact on neighboring communities. These courts have
applied their own state constitutional principles" -' and have found
them to impose more demanding standards 3 than those found in
the due process clause and relied on by the federal courts.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In zoning cases, the judiciary has traditionally deferred to local
legislation.3 4 This policy was established by the Supreme Court in
Euclid, and the presumption of the zoning ordinance's validity is
generally overcome only after showing a blatant constitutional
violation that is not justified by a compelling state interest. Courts
seldom look beyond the police power of the community to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the classification used by the local
municipality. As stated in Petaluma, "the federal court is not a
31. 416 U.S. at 7-8.
32. See, e.g., N.J. CoNsT. art. I, par. 1:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have
certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and ob-
taining safety and happiness....
which was applied in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 18 (1975)
to invalidate a zoning ordinance. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1 also recog-
nizes the natural, personal rights of Nebraska citizens.
33. 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725.
34. This, of course, does not follow if the ordinance violates a fundamental
constitutional principle. Segregating an area solely for one race would
make the ordinance immediately suspect under the reasoning of Bu-
chanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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super zoning board and should not be called to mark the point at
which legitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the
community are outweighed by legitimate regional interests. 35
By using the traditional due process analysis to determine
whether the purported goals of the ordinance in question bear any
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, the court does not
have to impose the more exacting standard of reasonableness,
which might be too strict to justify the means employed by the
municipality in furthering the stated goals of the ordinance. 36 The
rational basis test gives legislative bodies a reasonable margin
within which to ensure effective enforcement. As the Court said
in Euclid, "Such laws may also find their justification in the fact
that, in some fields, the bad fades into the good by such insensible
degrees that the two are not capable of being readily distinguished
and separated in terms of legislation. '37  When the purposes of
zoning classifications are fairly debatable, the courts have refrained
from intervening 38 thereby avoiding the necessity of developing
standards for judicial review. Such standards would be difficult to
apply to zoning ordinances because many consequences of the
ordinances are subtle and not capable of determination until the
plans have been implemented and the effects observed.3
0
The decision in Petaluma will be hailed as judicial approval of
a community's attempt to deal with the impending problems and
pressures of metropolitan growth. In this country, there is an
absence of statewide or regional planning to coordinate the efforts
of the individual communities which would be exposed to potential
abuse by the development market without some local control.40 To
35. 522 F.2d at 908.
36. See 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 43, 126-27 (1974).
37. 272 U.S. at 389.
38. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975);
Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); South Gwin-
nett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.-1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
901 (1974); Art Neon Co. v. Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Ann Arbor v. Northwest Park Constr.
Corp., 280 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1960); McLarty v. Ramsey, 270 F.2d 232
(3rd Cir. 1959).
39. See Miscura, Petaluma v. The T.J. Hooper; Must the Suburbs be Sea-
worthy?, 2 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 187, 188 (1975). Mal-
colm A. Miscura was the attorney representing the Association in oral
arguments before the Ninth Circuit and in the district court.
40. The California Government Code lists only the types of ordinances
that a local government may use, with no references to permissible
purposes for regulation. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West Supp. 1975).
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protect against these developmental demands, many communities
have passed zoning ordinances which limit growth or structure
growth so that it coincides with providing public services, such as
schools, sewer and water service, and police and fire protection.
Some of these communities have made an honest effort to weigh
the competing interests and to maximize the resulting benefits to
citizens that flow from such planning. At least under federal
constitutional principles, as evidenced by Petaluma, there is no
indication that such a local plan will be invalidated merely because
it did not confer substantially similar benefits on neighboring
communities.41 Thus, there is no affirmative obligation to consid-
er the regional impacts on the housing market which will be caused
by the local ordinance. 42
Some state courts have reached this same conclusion, where a
community has initiated a plan of phased growth. In Golden v.
Planning Board of Ramapo,43 the court was reluctant to substitute
its judgment as to the overall effectiveness of the city's plan for the
considered deliberations of its progenitors.4" It found that the
plan represented a bona fide effort to maximize population density
and that it was consistent with orderly growth.4 5
Where communities by their plans have attempted to stop
growth and thereby avoid the problems facing the metropolitan
area, other state courts have looked critically at such planning
which furthers only local interests and ignores regional growth
problems. Their decisions have been justified by state constitu-
tional requirements that are more demanding than those of the
Federal Constitution. For instance, in Southern Burlington Coun-
ty NAACP v. Mount Laurel46 the court found that the universal
and constant need for housing was so important and of such broad
public interest that the general welfare which developing communi-
ties must consider extends beyond their boundaries. It held,
broadly speaking, that each such municipality has a presumptive
However, section 65800 declares that the legislature's "intention (is]
to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that counties and
cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning
matters." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800 (West Supp. 1975). Because of
the absence of any discernible limitations on the local planning pow-
ers, Petaluma was, presumably, exercising its legislated police power
by enacting a phased growth ordinance.
41. FM., supra note 1, at 12.
42. See Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to
Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REv. 244 (1971).
43. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d '291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
44. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
45. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
46. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
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obligation to plan and provide for regional housing needs.4 7 When
local zoning ordinances become too restrictive, they cease to serve
the public welfare, and instead serve private interests. Such a result
is not justified by the police power of enabling statutes. However,
the view expressed in Mount Laurel and similar cases fails to give
proper consideration to the community's need to take adequate
steps to preserve its own resources and provide necessary facilities
for future residents.48  From these cases, it appears that when
there is a desperate need for housing on a regional level, a commu-
nity that is part of the region will apparently not be allowed to
avoid its share of the growth by imposing a limit on housing which
was not substantially equivalent to its proportionate share of the
market demand. A Petaluma-type numerical limit on new resi-
dential units would apparently not be upheld by these courts.
Despite this position adopted by some state courts, municipal
zoning is usually upheld absent a clear constitutional violation,
such as blatant racial discrimination; courts are reluctant to inter-
fere too actively since zoning is an exercise of police power re-
served to the states.49 In Petaluma, while the Plan was primarily
challenged as being arbitrary and unreasonable, and, thus, violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, it was also
claimed that it was exclusionary and did not further any legitimate
governmental interests. In disposing of this latter argument, the
court noted that any zoning restriction will have to exclude some
activity, structure, or inhabitants. It then went on to examine the
major issue which involved the constitutional parameters of the due
process argument.50
Zoning regulations must be justified by some aspect of the
state's police power asserted for the public welfare. This principle,
first announced in Euclid,51 has been the traditional source of
judicial deference to the local ordinance 52 and forms the basis for
decisions where the courts have refused to intervene.5 3
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
47. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728. See also Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Mad-
ison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Super. Ct. 1971), aff'd on re-
hearing, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Super. Ct. 1974).
48. Note, supra note 4, at 613.
49. Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved
Issues, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L. J. 689, 709 (1975).
50. 522 F.2d at 905.
51. 272 U.S. at 387.
52. See p. - supra.
53. See note 38 supra.
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that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spa-
cious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.54
Although courts have been concerned by the exclusionary ef-
fect of low density zoning55 because restricting the supply of
residential units is permanent and the demand for homes may
someday be unmet, phased zoning is temporary5 6 and thereby
evidences an ultimate commitment to regional housing needs.
57
The Petaluma Plan involved such phased growth to the extent that
it allowed 500 residential development units to be built per year.
This system of specifying the number of development units
presents a situation in which a court, if it decides to intervene, must
use its own judgment as to the housing needs of the community
and region, as well as other local decisions involving the provision
of municipal services. However, if the court does not allow the
community to set a numerical limit to the number of residential
development units which can be built, it may be stripping a com-
munity of a necessary technique to cope with the problems of
unrestrained growth. The community, in turn, is likely to substi-
tute another type of zoning ordinance which achieves the same
result,58 but which has gained judicial approval in other contexts.
Therefore, it seems that the wisest approach for the court is to
allow the community to impose rational and reasonable zoning
ordinances if there are no serious constitutional violations, and no
contrary federal, state, or regional controls, rather than have the
court embark on the rocky road of defining constitutional due
process limits for local zoning.
In adopting this approach, the major area of disagreement for
federal and state courts concerns whose general welfare the local
ordinance must further. The federal courts, relying on the police
power of the community as delegated by the state, have found that
a community need only provide for its own general welfare and not
that of the entire region which might be affected by local actions.
The Petaluma court recognized this potential impact on legitimate
regional housing needs,59 but left solution of this problem to the
54. 522 F.2d at 906, quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
55. Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L. J. 1418 (1969).
56. For a discussion of growth management techniques, see URBAN
GROWTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, Planning Advisory Service, Report
Nos. 309, 310 (Aug. 1975), which suggests that growth avoidance rather
than growth control is the important issue.
57. Note, supra note 4, at 614-15. See also Golden v. Planning Bd. of
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 379, 385 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152-
53 (1972).
58. For example, consider the comprehensive plan upheld in Golden.
59. 522 F.2d at 908.
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state legislature and not the federal court. This action is not
entirely consistent with Euclid wherein the Court recognized the
potential serious abuse of zoning powers by local authorities and
the impact it would have on neighboring communities.
It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the in-
terest of the municipality that the municipality would not be
allowed to stand in the way.60
Insularity of communities results in distortions of metropolitan
growth patterns and crippling of regional and statewide efforts to
solve the problems of pollution, decent housing, and public trans-
portation. Communities find themselves no longer adhering to the
"growth is good" concept. 61 Phased growth does represent a
concession to growth pressures as well as a determination to slow
growth to a desired rate. Up to now, federal courts have not found
that the general public interest so far outweighs the local interest
that the latter should not be allowed to stand, except where to do so
results in constitutional violations. Whether the scope of general
welfare will be extended to deal with a plan such as that in
Petaluma which imposed growth restrictions in a metropolitan
region remains to be seen. At this time, the Belle Terre decision
makes it seem unlikely.
When local plans have failed to give proper consideration to
their impact on regional needs, some state courts have intervened.
Such was the situation in National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn62 where
the zoning ordinance required a minimum area of four acres per
building lot in certain residential districts in the township. The
court found that judicial review of such an ordinance demanded
60. 272 U.S. at 390.
61. Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. L. REv. 234 (1973). In his article,
Bosselman warns that any sophisticated use of development timing re-
quires enforceable regional planning policies and that extensive use
will result in a major increase in housing costs. This will effectively
preclude all but upper income groups from areas that adopt develop-
ment timing because the amount of land available for housing will
be restricted and its cost increased. He criticizes the Ramapo decision
because its ordinance may prevent urban sprawl within its borders,
but it contributes to the far more serious problem of megalopolitan
sprawl. Id. at 248.
62. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). Following this decision has resulted
in invalidation of ordinances for minimum lot sizes (two and three
acres) as unreasonable and unconstitutional in Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) and Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), where the community had failed to
provide zoning for apartment uses.
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more than a determination that the objectives were rationally fur-
thered by the means chosen. It said that
the time must never come when, because of frustration with con-
cepts foreign to their legal training, courts abdicate their judicial
responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of individual citi-
zens. Thus, the burden of proof imposed upon one who challenges
the validity of a zoning regulation must never be made so onerous
as to foreclose, for all practical purposes, a landowner's avenue
of redress against the infringement of constitutionally protected
rights.63
Courts have used a variety of reasons to strike down local ordi-
nances which have furthered local interests at the expense of
regional interests, 4 thus indicating a willingness to intervene when
legislatures have failed to provide workable solutions for communi-
ties.
The Petaluma court utilized the traditional rational relationship
test whereby the exclusionary effect of the Plan had to bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.6 5 It compared
the purposes and effect of the Plan to those which had been
validated in Belle Terre and Ybarra, saying that the plans in each
63. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607.
64. For example, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), the court invalidated
general ordinance requirements which realistically permitted construc-
tion of homes only within the financial reach of persons of at least
middle income. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning
Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (Ch. Div. 1974), found that a
qualification in an amendment to a zoning ordinance relating to senior
citizen communities, which provided that residency was limited to per-
sons of at least 52 years of age was unconstitutional. Taxpayers Ass'n
of Weymouth Township v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376,
311 A.2d 187 (App. Div. 1973), invalidated an ordinance limiting occu-
pancy in mobile home parks to those 52 years of age or over and those
under that age, but over 18, who were members of a family the head
of which was 52 years of age or over. Board of Supervisors of Fair-
fax County v. DeGroff Enter., Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973),
declared that an enabling statute permitted localities to enact only tra-
ditional zoning ordinances directed to physical characteristics and
struck down an ordinance directed at socio-economic objectives.
Bridge Park Co. v. Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super. 219, 273 A.2d 397
(App. Div. 1971), invalidated an ordinance because the municipality
sought to regulate the ownership of buildings and types of tenancies
permitted, purposes not justified by the enabling statute.
65. A zoning ordinance must conform to a comprehensive plan in order
to escape claims of arbitrariness. When a community adopts an or-
dinance in accordance with a comprehensive plan, it is virtually as-
sured of judicial acceptance under traditional doctrines because courts
attach great weight to evidence that a local government is being
thoughtful about its land-use regulations. Note, supra note 4, at 599-
600. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288
N.Y.S.2d 888, 894 (1968).
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of those cases had been "more restrictive" than the Petaluma
Plan.66
Relying on Belle Terre to justify the 500-unit limit on residen-
tial development-units seems questionable since Belle Terre did not
raise the issue of whether a municipality could control its growth in
the face of metropolitan development pressure. Although Petalu-
ma noted that as a result of its zoning ordinance Belle Terre would
probably not exceed its present population of 700,67 it is more
likely that the village would not grow in population because its
total land area is less than one-square mile. The problems faced
by Belle Terre are unlike those confronting Petaluma, where there
are broad undeveloped areas in a metropolitan environment which
is feeling intensive development pressure. A narrower view of
Belle Terre indicates that in that case the Supreme Court was
concerned with the Village's definition of "family," and whether
the zoning ordinance interfered with any constitutionally protected
rights in that context.68 Although arguably the Belle Terre ordi-
nance was not a reasonable attempt to achieve its stated purpose
and sought instead to forbid college students from living within the
Village's boundaries rather than to preserve quiet family neighbor-
hoods,69 it at least bore a rational relationship to what the Court
decided was a legitimate state objective. In broad dictum the
Court gave guidance for federal courts in determining the rationale
basis of such an ordinance:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehi-
cles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a landuse project ad-
dressed to family needs. . . . The police power is not confined to
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people. 70
This language gives municipalities a broad range of zoning
techniques to use to cope with development pressures. The pur-
pose of the Petaluma Plan, i.e., to preserve the city's small town
character, seems to be a legitimate state objective under Belle Terre
standards. However, the 500-unit limit on residential develop-
ment-units is more likely to ensure that Petaluma remains a small
66. 522 F.2d at 906.
67. The Belle Terre plan restricted land use to one-family dwellings ex-
cluding lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, and multi-
ple-dwelling houses. 416 U.S. at 2.
68. For analysis of the Belle Terre decision, see 60 CORNELL L. REv. 299
(1975); 50 WASH. L. REv. 421 (1975); and 19 VILL. L. REv. 819 (1974).
69. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 36, at 126-27. See also
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12-20 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
70. 416 U.S. at 9.
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town rather than to preserve its character since the character of a
community is not determined by its size, but rather by affirmative
steps it takes to protect those values which it considers to be worthy
of preservation.71
In Ybarra, the other case relied on by the Petaluma court, the
City of Los Altos Hills passed a zoning ordinance providing that a
house lot should contain not less than one acre and that no lot
should be occupied by more than one primary dwelling unit. It
was contended that the ordinance discriminated against Mexican-
Americans and the poor. Although some state courts have struck
down minimum lot size zoning requirements, 72 the Ninth Circuit
found the ordinance discriminated only against the poor and not
against any ethnic group and upheld it as rationally related to
preserving the town's rural environment.7 3 By refusing to allow
any greater population density, the effect of the ordinance was to
stop growth permanently and keep out the poor, who could not
afford to purchase or build on the large lots; however, growth
control was not the basis of the challenge. Therefore, since no
racial discrimination was found, the validity of the ordinance was
sustained under traditional equal protection analysis.7 4
While these ordinances are being upheld in federal courts, they
are being criticized in state courts as an attempt to preserve purely
parochial interests, while ignoring an obligation to assume the
community's share of regional housing needs and other problems.
Almost everyone acts solely in its own selfish and parochial in-
terest and in effect builds a wall around itself to keep out those
people or entities not adding favorably to the tax base, despite
the location of the municipality or the demand for varied kinds
of housing.75
Because federal courts seem intent on following a course of nonin-
tervention in the absence of blatant constitutional violations, it
seems likely that more state courts will be asked to respond to
71. For a decision that found such an ordinance preserving "small town
character" to be a constitutionally impermissible goal under state con-
stitutional standards, see Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 236 A.2d 395
(1970). There the court found that a zoning ordinance which pro-
tected the character or aesthetic nature of the municipality was not
sufficient justification for an exclusionary zoning technique.
72. See note 62 supra.
73. 503 F.2d at 254.
74. For an analysis and criticism of zoning as a method of exclusion and
discrimination, and for an excellent collection of cases dealing with
exclusionary zoning, see NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DiscRIMINATION &
URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FAIm HOUSING & EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE
(1974).
75. 67 N.J. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723. "Local limitation on growth is a foolish
response to a serious problem .... " Bosselman, supra note 61, at
248.
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exclusionary tactics of communities attempting to avoid the prob-
lems of urban development and growth.
The federal courts' policy of nonintervention is justified. If
they were to intercede they would be responding to judicially
perceived regional needs, without benefit of any comprehensive
regional planning. The limitations of the adversary process make
it doubtful whether the courts could even ascertain the actual needs
of the region. Furthermore, in the absence of a regionally devel-
oped plan, any judicial response would be totally arbitrary and not
in accordance with sound land use planning principles. Also,
judicial intervention might paralyze legitimate legislative attempts
to rationalize development."6 The situation in Petaluma exempli-
fies this latter situation. The city had undertaken an extensive
collection of data and evaluation of the needs and goals of the
present inhabitants of the community and then had developed a
plan which it thought was a rational means to attain these goals,
while allowing the necessary flexibility to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances. If the court finds that the community is pursuing
permissible goals, it should refrain from second-guessing or inter-
fering as long as the city has chosen rational methods. If the court
is unwilling or unable to set out clear standards for the community
to follow, or to outline the regional problems each community must
help solve, then it should refrain from intervening if the state
legislature has not provided a workable solution.
Although judicial nonintervention leaves the municipality rela-
tively unrestricted in developing its land use policies, arguably this
stance may result in more pressure on legislatures to pass legisla-
tion to cope with these problems. Because of the specialization of
the courts and the limitations of the adversary process, it seems that
the problems encountered in land use planning are ones that courts
are singularly incapable of handling.7 7 However, in the situation
of a well-documented case, the courts could determine that region-
al needs were not sufficiently considered and could require appro-
priate amendment of an ordinance.78
Petaiuma leaves several issues unanswered. It is not certain
whether the constitutional guarantee of a right to travel is the
appropriate standard by which to judge land use and zoning
cases.7 9 Because the Plan provided affirmatively for some growth
76. Note, supra note 4, at 608-11.
77. See Walsh, supra note 43, at 267.
78. The district court decision and the right to travel issue are discussed
in 5 GOLDEN GATE L. RPv. 485 (1975); 36 OHIo ST. LJ. 128 (1975);
28 VAND. L. Rzv. 430 (1975); 1975 WASH. L.Q. 234.
79. For recommendations offered to deal with regional housing and
growth problems, see Bosselman, supra note 61, at 250; Fagin, supra
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and regional needs, it is unclear how far a community must go to
meet these needs or whether they can be totally ignored. It is also
questionable as to whether the Federal Constitution allows cities to
regulate growth so as to control market demands, which will have a
direct influence on the price of new housing.
It was not the purpose of this article to suggest that state courts
are more appropriate forums in which to litigate these issues, than
is the federal judiciary. Both are faced with the same limitations
of having to develop the contours for judicial review outside the
context of legislative standards. The ultimate solution for dealing
with the complex problems facing local communities in the shadow
of metropolitan growth should come from the legislatures.80 Al-
though the states have surrendered their regulatory power to local
communities,81 when this power is exercised in a manner detrimen-
tal to neighboring communities, they should utilize their police
power in favor of regional planning. 82
VI. CONCLUSION
The Petaluma court was willing to validate a particular com-
munity's effort to cope with metropolitan growth pressures. It,
therefore, continues the policy followed by other federal courts of
deferring to local zoning ordinances so long as they seem to further
a legitimate state objective and so long as the means employed
through the ordinance is rationally related to its purpose. Al-
though the local plan may frustrate some regional housing and
development plans, the federal courts will not intervene. Thus, the
Federal Constitution may be considered as less demanding than
state constitutions in the obligations it imposes on communities in
regard to the burden of regional problems.
Alan D. Slattery '77
note 25, at 302-04; Gruen, The Economics of Petaluma: Unconstitu-
tional Regional Socio-Economic Impacts, 2 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL
or GROWTH 173 (1975); Weinberg, Regional Land-Use Control: Pre-
requisites for Rational Planning, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 786, 799 (1971);
Note, A Wrong Without a Remedy: Judicial Approaches to Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 6 RuTGERs-CAwIDEN L. J. 727 (1975).
80. Note, supra note 4, at 609.
81. Weinberg, supra note 79, at 788-89.
82. [I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning
power is a police power of the state and the local authority
is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in
the same manner as is the state. So, when regulation does
have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's
citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality
cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.
67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
